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ABSTRACT: In April 2015 the European Commission opened an antitrust proceedings 
against Google with regard to its business practices related to Android, the famous 
smartphone and tablet operating system. According to the Commission, Google has abused 
of its dominant position in that it has allegedly required or incentivized smartphone and 
tablet manufacturers to exclusively pre-install Google’s own applications or services, 
prevented smartphone and tablet manufacturers from developing and marketing modified 
and potentially competing versions of Android, tied or bundled certain Google applications 
and services distributed on Android devices with other Google applications, services, and/or 
application programming interfaces of Google. The purpose of the article is to find a solution 
to the case in light of the judgment passed by the Court of First Instance of the European 
Union in Microsoft and show that Google's business practice does not amount to a violation 
of competition rules in that it protects both consumers and free competition. 
KEY WORDS: Abuse of a dominant position; European Commission; Google; Android; Court 
of First Instance of the European Union; Microsoft. 
1. Introduction 
 In a 2014 resolution, the European Parliament noted that the online search market is 
of particular importance in ensuring competitive conditions within the digital single market, 
given the potential development of search engines into gatekeepers and the possibility they 
have of commercialising secondary exploitation of information obtained; therefore, the 
Commission was urged to enforce EU competition rules in order to ensure remedies that 
truly benefit consumers, Internet users, online businesses and to consider proposals 
intended to unbundle search engines from other commercial services.1 
                                                 
*Giulia Funghi, JD (University of Padova Law School, Italy) is a trainee lawyer, 
funghigiulia@gmail.com. Alessandro Rosanò, PhD, is Teaching Assistant of International Law and 
European Union Law at the University of Padova Law School (Italy), a.rosano@hotmail.it. Giulia Funghi 
wrote paragraphs 3 and 4. Alessandro Rosanò wrote paragraphs 1,2, and 5. The Authors share the 
same view on the topic. 
1See European Parliament, Resolution of 27 November 2014 on Supporting Consumer Rights in the 
Digital Single Market, available at 
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 The proceedings brought by the European Commission against Google may be 
regarded as the most proper case to exemplify the issues that have been put under the spot 
by the European Parliament with regard to EU competition rules, especially as far as the 
prohibition of abuse of a dominant position is concerned.2As we intend to show in this 
article, Google's business practice related to Android could be regarded either as anti-
competitive in nature and prejudicial to consumers' rights or intended to protect consumers' 
needs by ensuring the efficiency of its operating system (OS).It is our opinion that an 
answer to this dilemma may be found in the judgment passed by the Court of First Instance 
of the European Union (CFI) in Microsoft. In fact, the situation underlying that the antitrust 
proceedings brought against Google seems to resemble the one which concerned Microsoft 
more than ten years ago when the company was accused of tying Windows Media Player to 
its OS, therefore abusing a dominant position. Moving to present days, Google has been 
accused of doing something really similar with regard to its online search engine (Google 
Search) and the applications that run on the Android OS for mobile devices.  
 Thus, provided the background to the Android antitrust proceedings brought against 
Google (paragraph 2), a swift analysis of Microsoft is provided (paragraph 3) and applied to 
the present issue (paragraph 4) in order to draw some conclusions (paragraph 5).  
 
2. Background to the Android antitrust proceedings against Google 
 Android is a mobile OS based on the Linux kernel.3 The company was founded in 
2003 and Google bought it in 2005. In 2007 the OS was launched and in less than ten years 
it has achieved huge success. In fact, in 2011 its market share added up to 15.31% while 
Apple's iOS controlled the clear majority of the market (52.4%). Today, Android's market 
share adds up to 64.07% while Apple's iOS controls less than 30% of the relevant market 
(28.64%).4 One of Android's main feature is that it is an open-source system, meaning that 
it can be freely used and developed by anyone in order to create a modified version of the 
mobile OS which is called an 'Android fork'.5 
 Suspecting that Google could have breached EU rules prohibiting anti-competitive 
agreements and the abuse of a dominant position, on 15 April 2015 the European 
Commission opened an antitrust proceedings against the American company with regard to 
its business practices related to Android. On 20 April 2016 the European Commission 
initiated an antitrust proceedings against Alphabet, Google's parent company, for the same 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2014-0071&language=EN 
(30 September 2016). One may also want to check European Parliament, Resolution of 19 January 
2016 on Towards a Digital Single Market Act, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT%2BTA%2BP8-TA-
2016-0009%2B0%2BDOC%2BXML%2BV0%2F%2FEN&language=EN (30 September 2016). 
2 On the abuse of a dominant position, see WHISH, R., BAILEY, D. Competition Law. Oxford University 
Press, 2015, FAULL, J., NIKPAY, A. (eds) The EU Law of Competition. Oxford University Press, 2014, 
O'DONOGHUE, R., PADILLA, A.J.The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU.Hart Publishing, 2013, 
BELLIS, J.F., VAN BAEL, I. Il Diritto Comunitario Della Concorrenza. G. Giappichelli editore, 2009. 
3The kernel is the central component of an OS. 
4See http://www.netmarketshare.com (30 September 2016). 
5As a general rule, a fork happens when a developer uses the source code of a software and create a 
distinct piece of software. For further information, see: http://www.androidcentral.com/what-fork-fork 
(30 September 2016). 
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reason.6 
 Since manufacturers enter into agreements with Google to obtain the right to install 
Google applications on their smartphones and tablets, the Commission's investigation has 
focused on whether Google's conduct has been in breach of EU antitrust rules in that it 
might have hindered the development and market access of rival mobile OSs, applications 
and services. According to the Commission, Google is dominant in the markets for general 
Internet search services, licensable smart mobile OSs, and app stores for the Android mobile 
OS as it holds market shares of more than 90% in each of these markets in the European 
Economic Area (EEA). Its behaviour has apparently denied consumers a wider choice of 
mobile apps and services while also standing in the way of innovation by other players. 
 More specifically, the Commission has taken three allegations into account so far: a) 
whether Google has required or incentivised smartphone and tablet manufacturers to 
exclusively pre-install Google’s own applications or services; b) whether Google has 
prevented smartphone and tablet manufacturers who wish to install Google applications and 
services on some of their Android devices from developing and marketing modified and 
potentially competing versions of Android (the Android forks) on other devices; c) whether 
Google has tied or bundled certain Google applications and services distributed on Android 
devices with other Google applications, services, and/or application programming interfaces 
of Google. For what concerns the first one, Google has allegedly granted significant financial 
incentives to some smartphone and tablet manufacturers as well as mobile network 
operators on condition that they exclusively pre-install Google Search on their devices, 
thereby reducing the incentives of manufacturers and mobile network operators to pre-
install competing search services on the devices they market. 
 With regard to the second one, according to the Commission, Google requires the 
manufacturers that wish to pre-install Google proprietary apps to enter into an Anti-
Fragmentation Agreement that commits them not to sell devices running on Android forks. 
Thus, Google's conduct would have had a direct impact on consumers as it would have 
denied them accessing to innovative smart mobile devices based on alternative, potentially 
superior, versions of the Android OS. 
 As far as the third one, the Commission believes that, in the contracts signed by 
Google with manufacturers, the licensing of the Play Store (Google's app store for Android) 
on Android devices has been made conditional on Google Search being pre-installed and set 
as default search service. As a result, rival search engines would not be able to become the 
default search service on the majority of devices sold in the EEA. Furthermore, in its 
contracts with manufacturers Google would have required the pre-installation of its Chrome 
mobile browser in return for licensing the Play Store or Google Search.  
 According to the Commission, there are a number of factors that lead to believe that 
Google is dominant in the markets for general Internet search services, licensable smart 
mobile OSs, and app stores for the Android mobile OS. For what concerns general Internet 
search services, Google holds more than 90% of market shares in most EU Member States. 
Focusing on licensable smart mobile OSs, the percentage of market shares is the same.Also, 
one should consider that Android is used on virtually all smartphones and tablets in the 
lower price range. So, the more consumers adopt an OS, the more developers write apps for 
                                                 
6Case no. 40099, Google Android. All the information are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40099 (30 September 
2016). 
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that OS (this is called network effect) and, as a consequence, Android users who would like 
to switch to other OSs would face significant switching costs as they would lose their apps, 
data, and contacts. For what concerns app stores for the Android mobile OS, Google Play 
Store accounts for more than 90% of apps downloaded on Android devices in the EEA. It is 
pre-installed on the large majority of Android devices in the EEA and is not available for 
download by end users who cannot download other app stores from the Play Store. Thus, 
Android users are not likely to switch to app stores for other OSs as they would have to 
purchase a new device and would face significant switching costs. 
 So, from the Commission's point of view, Google has tied Internet search to the most 
popular mobile OS in order to preserve and strengthen its dominance in that market area. 
Soon after the Statement of Objections was released, Google reacted with a post on its blog, 
underlying that its partner agreements are entirely voluntary, meaning that anyone can use 
Android without Google.7 In addition, Google stressed that manufacturers who want to be 
part of the Android ecosystem have to test and certify that their devices will support Android 
apps: otherwise, the apps could not work from one Android device to the other.8 
 
3. Microsoft v Commission  
 Microsoft9 is one of the best renowned cases concerning the abuse of a dominant 
position. Microsoft was accused of refusing to share information that would allow 
interoperability between its server and equipment developed by Sun Microsystem, a 
software company. Afterwards, Microsoft was accused of tying Windows Media Player - that 
is to say, its own media software - to its own OS. The European Commission ordered 
Microsoft to pay a fine, disclose the server information, and produce a version of the 
Windows OS without Windows Media Player.10Microsoft did not comply and sought the 
annulment of that decision. 
 For what concerns the charge of abusive tying, the European Commission took four 
factors into consideration: a) the tying and tied products were two separate products; b) the 
undertaking concerned was dominant in the market for the tying product; c) the undertaking 
concerned does not did customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied 
product; and d) the practice in question foreclosed competition.11 
                                                 
7In the words of Google Senior Vice President and General Counsel, “try it - you can download the 
entire operating system for free, modify it how you want, and build a phone.And major companies like 
Amazon do just that”. See http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.it/2016/04/androids-model-of-open-
innovation.html (30 September 2016). 
8In the words of Google Senior Vice President and General Counsel, “imagine how frustrating it would 
be if an app you downloaded on one Android phone didn’t also work on your replacement Android 
phone from the same manufacturer”. See http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.it/2016/04/androids-
model-of-open-innovation.html (30 September 2016). 
9Case T-201/04Microsoft v Commission [2007] II-3601. For an analysis of the case, see 
ANDREANGELI, A. “Case note on T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission, judgment of 17 September 
2007”, Common Market Law Review 44, P. 863, COLANGELO, G., PARDOLESI, R. “Microsoft, 
igiudicieuropei e l'antitrust di unavolta”, Il Foroitaliano,2008, P.114, PARDOLESI, R., RENDA, A. “The 
European Commission's Case Against Microsoft: Kill Bill?”, World Competition, 27, P.513-566, 
HOWARTH, D., McMAHON, K. “Windows has Performed an Illegal Operation: the Court of First 
Instance's Judgment in Microsoft v Commission”, European Competition Law Review, 29, P.117-134. 
10See Commission Decision of 24 May 2004 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement against Microsoft Corporation (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 – 
Microsoft), in OJ L 32, 6 February 2007, 23. 
11See Microsoft, para 842. 
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  With regard to the first factor, the CFI held that customers may wish to obtain the 
OS and the media software together, but from different sources, or it may be consumers do 
not need a media software at all. Also, in light of the nature and technical features of the 
products concerned, the facts observed on the market, the history of the development of the 
products and Microsoft’s commercial practice, the CFI thought the European Commission 
had demonstrated the existence of separate consumer demand for streaming media players. 
More specifically, “there are distributors who develop and supply streaming media players on 
an autonomous basis, independently of client PC operating systems. Thus, Apple supplies its 
QuickTime player separately from its client PC operating systems. A further particularly 
convincing example is that of RealNetworks, Microsoft’s main competitor on the streaming 
media players market, which neither develops nor sells client PC operating systems. In that 
regard, it must be pointed out that, according to the case-law the fact that there are on the 
market independent companies specialised in the manufacture and sale of the tied product 
constitutes serious evidence of the existence of a separate market for that product. […] 
Microsoft, as it confirmed in answer to a written question put by the Court, develops and 
markets versions of Windows Media Player which are designed to work with its competitors’ 
client PC operating systems, namely Apple’s Mac OS X and Sun’s Solaris. Similarly, 
RealNetworks’ RealPlayer works with, inter alia, the Windows, Mac OS X, Solaris and some 
UNIX operating systems. […] Windows Media Player can be downloaded, independently of 
the Windows client PC operating system, from Microsoft’s Internet site. Likewise, Microsoft 
releases upgrades of Windows Media Player, independently of releases or upgrades of its 
Windows client PC operating system”.12 
 Most of all, the CFI stressed the difference between the nature of Windows as an OS, 
thus as a system software, and Windows Media Player as an application software. While the 
former controls the hardware of the computer and enables the user to make use of it, the 
latter runs on it. Therefore, the CFI concluded that an OS and a media player constitute two 
separate products.13 
 For what concerns the second factor, Microsoft did not dispute its dominant position, 
so the CFI did not focus on that issue.14 
 With regard to the third factor, the Court found that consumers were not allowed to 
acquire the Windows OS without purchasing Windows Media Player, meaning they did not 
have a choice to obtain the former without the latter. Also, it was not possible to uninstall 
Windows Media Player. Thus, the condition relating to the imposition of supplementary 
obligations was satisfied.15 
 For what concerns the fourth factor, the bundling of Windows Media Player with the 
Windows OS without the possibility of removing the media software from the OS, allowed 
Windows Media Player to benefit from the ubiquity of the OS on PCs. Windows Media Player 
automatically achieved a level of market penetration corresponding to that of the Windows 
OS without having to compete on the merits with competing products.16 
 Finally, the CFI held that Microsoft had not demonstrated the existence of any 
objective justification for the abusive bundling of Windows Media Player with the Windows 
                                                 
12See Microsoft, para 922-929, 933. 
13See Microsoft, para 926. 
14See Microsoft, para 843. 
15See Microsoft, para 961, 963, 975. 
16See Microsoft, para 1036-1038, 1046, 1090. 
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client PC operating system. Therefore, the Court confirmed the European Commission 
decision with regard to the fine, the disclosure of information and the production of a version 
of the Windows OS without Windows Media Player.17 
 
4. Assessing Google Android in light of Microsoft. 
Then, one can try to apply the reasoning expressed by the CFI in Microsoft to the Google 
Android case in order to assess whether Google may be found “guilty as charged”. 
 So, first of all: are Android and its applications two separate products? Yes, they are. 
In fact, Android is an OS, that is to say, a software system, while Google Play Service, 
Google Chrome and the other Google apps are applications software. The former controls 
the hardware of the mobile phone or the tablet and makes it possible for users to use them, 
while the latter runs on it.  
 Second of all: is Google dominant in the market of the tying product, that is to say in 
the smartphone and tablet OS market? As stated above, in 2016 its market share has added 
up to 64.07% and Apple's iOS - that is to say, the closest competitor - trails at 28.64%. But 
is it enough to say that Google is actually dominant? In a market as multi-sided as the 
digital one, being dominant in one sector is not enough in that it is necessary a certain 
degree of market power in every part of the market. Google's business practice related to 
Android seems to suggest that no matter the position that Google may have in the mobile 
OS market, that would be neutralized by the fact that all the downstream companies have 
free access to the upstream platform.18 Google cannot act like a company holding a 
dominant position because Android is an open-source and free software whose source code 
has been entirely disclosed19. So, Google cannot behave independently of its 
competitors20and its dominance could be proved only if it were possible for them not to 
innovate and still retain its market power21. In a framework as dynamic as this one, market 
shares have a very limited importance as they simply mean that a firm keeps innovating at 
least as fast as its competitors22.  
 Thirdly, does Google give customers a choice to obtain Android without Google Play 
and Google Mobile Service? If it were not possible to get the apps without the OS, then one 
would be in the presence of a tying practice, but that does not seem to be the case. For 
instance, about 70% of Android smartphones sold in China come without Google Play23so it 
is actually possible not to get the different products together. 
                                                 
17See Microsoft, para 1146. 
18 See MAIR, C. “Paranoid Android? EU Commission vs. Google's Mobile Android OS”, available at 
http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/paranoid-android-eu-commission-vs.-googles-mobile-android-os (30 
September 2016). 
19See https://chillingcompetition.com/2013/09/05/some-thoughts-on-the-new-anti-google-android-
complaint-post-13/ (30 September 2016). 
20See Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities 
in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, in 
OJ C 45, 24 February 2009, 7. 
21In Case no M.6281, Microsoft/Skype, the European Commission stated that “the innovation cycles in 
these markets are short. As a result, software and platforms are constantly being redeveloped. 
Innovators generally enjoy a short lead in the market” (para 83).  
22See KORBER T. “The commission's next big thing?- Why the Google case is not Microsoft reloaded”, 
Neue Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht, 2015, P.415. 
23See KORBER, T. “Let's talk about Android - Observations on Competition in the field of Mobile 
operating System”,  Neue Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht, P.378. 
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 Finally, does Google's business practice foreclose competition? No, it does not and all 
things considered, it makes possible to competition to thrive since the contracts do not 
impose exclusivity: they simply ensure that users get a device with a fully operating set of 
Google apps.  
 As far as the foreclosure of competition is concerned, one should consider the forks 
issue. Generally speaking, the Android forks should be regarded as something positive as 
they are the manifest sign of how vibrant and open to innovation this market sector is. 
However, from the consumers' viewpoint, this may result in a harbinger of problems: in fact, 
the spread of Android forks may lead to the fragmentation of the Android system, meaning 
that it would be much more complicated to develop and use applications that actually work 
on Android. As a matter of fact, a potentially infinite number of Android systems could be 
developed and it would be very difficult to have a proper version of every app running on 
every Android version. That would affect app developers, who would have a very hard time 
trying to figure it out what to do, and consumers as well, who would run the risk of buying a 
tablet or a smartphone which could not be used. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 From the viewpoint of competition law, it is highly likely that Google will be for the 
years to come what Microsoft was at the beginning of the new millennium: the company 
whose behaviours would be strictly scrutinised, favouring further developments in that area 
of law.  
 It does not come as a surprise that the European Commission has decided to initiate 
a number of proceedings against Alphabet and Google. For instance, the Commission is 
investigating the way in which Google displays its own comparison shopping service and that 
of competitors in its general search results as a possible case of abuse of a dominant 
position.24 In the past, the Commission investigated some merger operations concluded by 
Google25 and an ad hoc aid granted to Google Poland by Polish authorities.26 Finally, it seems 
that Google will face other investigations as the European Commission is focusing its 
attention on the company’s search services, the copying of third-party content and 
advertising.27 It is self-evident that the technology which is able to attract a higher number 
                                                 
24Case no 39740, Google Search. All the information are available on 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39740 (30 September 
2016). Two other cases (Case no 39768 and case no 39775) have been merged with this one. On this 
topic, see MAYS, L. “The Consequences of Search Bias: How Application of the Essential Facilities 
Doctrine Remedies Google's Unrestricted Monopoly on Search in the United States and Europe”, The 
George Washington Law Review, 83, available at http://www.gwlr.org/the-consequences-of-search-
bias-how-application-of-the-essential-facilities-doctrine-remedies-googles-unrestricted-monopoly-on-
search-in-the-united-states-and-europe/ (30 September 2016). 
25Case no M.7813, Sanofi / Google / DMI JV, case no M.6381, Google / Motorola Mobility, and case no 
4731, Google / Doubleclick. All the operation were declared compatible with the internal market and 
the EEA Agreement. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7813 (30 September 
2016). 
26Case N67/2008, Google Poland Sp. z o.o. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_N67_2008 (30 
September 2016). 
27See https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/20/eu-commission-google-android-skew-
market-competition-antitrust-vestager (30 September 2016). One should remember that the US 
Federal Trade Commission has been focusing its attention on Android too. See 
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of new consumers becomes the standard in a given field as it is self-evident that consumers 
are more likely to adopt the most widespread technology or the technology they believe will 
become the most widespread. In light of that, one cannot deny that Google has become the 
standard in the search engine market. However, one should be aware of the peculiar 
features of the markets related to information technology. Google controls the clear majority 
of the total market shares on a global scale equaling to 71.11% and the closest competitor 
is Bing which trails at 10.65%. However, in 2013, Google controlled 77.46% and, in 2011, 
its market share added up to 82.99%.28. It has already been underlined that if Facebook 
decided to join the search engine market, that could change the market landscape 
dramatically as Facebook could overcome Google and become the new dominant Internet 
search engine and navigator.29 The same reasoning applies to the OSs market and the 
position (Google) Android holds in it. 
 Free flow of information and technological developments make it very difficult to keep 
a dominant position as everyone is trying to develop the next big thing. Think for instance 
about search engines and the clash between Internet Explorer and Netscape Navigator which 
took place between the end of the nineties and the beginning of the new millennium. Think 
about MySpace or Second Life as far as social networks are concerned. Information 
technology is a place where the password to (almost) everything seems to be “faster and 
better”. The peculiar features of the digital market do not make easy to evaluate the fairness 
of an undertaking's conducts: in fact, classic standards may prove quite useless. This of 
course does not mean that those conducts do not fall within the scope of competition law 
and all the subjects that are involved - such as the European Commission, consumers, 
competitors - should rely on the dominant undertaking's self-corrective capacity.30However, 
the existing regulations should be implemented and adapted in order to reflect their 
competitive dynamics, avoiding that an excessively interventionist approach inhibits 
companies from continuing to invest in R&D and innovation.  
 New technologies have changed the way companies do business in every economic 
sector and the EU competition policy must take this into account.31 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-extends-probe-into-googles-android-1461699217 (30 September 
2016). Leaving competition law aside, one should remember the issues related to the right to be 
forgotten. See Case C-131/12 Google Spain and Google [2014] published in the electronic Report of 
cases. For a review, see KOUTRAKOS, P., NIC SHUIBHNE, N. “To strive, to seek, to Google, to forget”, 
European Law Review, 40, P.293. 
28See https://www.netmarketshare.com (30 September 2016). 
29AULETTA, K. Googled: The End of the World as We Know It. Penguin Books, 2009. 
30KLEIN, J.I. “The Importance of Antitrust Enforcement in the New Economy”, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/1338.htm (30 September 2016): “Just as using antitrust 
law to implement social policy is a mistake, so too is a religious faith in self-correcting markets. There 
is a need for antitrust enforcement to aid the free market and, at its legitimate core, such a role 
focuses on assuring that market power doesn't restrain competition that consumers would otherwise 
enjoy. And a properly focused concern about market power, in turn, requires surgical intervention 
precisely because businesses benefit from efficiency and market power alike, whereas consumers 
benefit from the former but not the latter. So our job is to make sure that we take out the fat (market 
power) without taking out the muscle (efficiency).” 
31 PONS, J.F. “European Competition policy in the New Economy”, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2001_012_en.pdf (30 September 2016): “Applying 
competition law in new economy cases is very difficult. The judgements that have to be made are 
often fine ones - allowing an operation to go through could close a new market completely, whilst 
prohibiting or imposing conditions on another could stifle innovation and prevent technical progress.” 
